Files
configure-aws-credentials/src/index.ts
T
Tom Keller 4d281fbc56 fix: enforce allowed-account-ids on all auth paths (#1847)
* fix: enforce allowed-account-ids on all auth paths

The allowed-account-ids list was only enforced in some auth flows. This
was due to the check being included in validateCredentials, which was
skipped if (GITHUB_ACTIONS && AccessKeyId && output-env-credentials) ->
false.

This unifies credential validation into a single path.

- validateCredentials(credentials?, ...) resolves credentials, proves
  liveness via one GetCallerIdentity call, and returns the identity.
- validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds, account) is now a pure comparison
  against the resolved account, enforced against the final (assumed)
  account independent of auth method, GITHUB_ACTIONS, or
  output-env-credentials.
- exportAccountId(identity, ...) consumes the resolved identity instead of
  making its own GetCallerIdentity call, so credential resolution happens
  exactly once per credential set.

Pre-assume account checks remain gated on !roleToAssume so cross-account
assume-role (source account differs from the role's target) is preserved.

Adds regression tests for the OIDC wrong-account case (the previously
missing negative test), OIDC with output-env-credentials: false, and the
assume-role wrong-account case.

* chore: move validateAccountId into helpers
2026-06-26 13:33:19 -07:00

327 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

import * as core from '@actions/core';
import type { AssumeRoleCommandOutput } from '@aws-sdk/client-sts';
import { assumeRole } from './assumeRole';
import { CredentialsClient } from './CredentialsClient';
import {
areCredentialsValid,
errorMessage,
exportAccountId,
exportCredentials,
exportRegion,
getBooleanInput,
retryAndBackoff,
toCredentialIdentity,
translateEnvVariables,
unsetCredentials,
validateAccountId,
verifyKeys,
} from './helpers';
import { writeProfileFiles } from './profileManager';
const DEFAULT_ROLE_DURATION = 3600; // One hour (seconds)
const ROLE_SESSION_NAME = 'GitHubActions';
const REGION_REGEX = /^[a-z0-9-]+$/g;
const ROLE_SESSION_NAME_REGEX = /^[\w+=,.@-]*$/;
export async function run() {
try {
translateEnvVariables();
// Get inputs
// Undefined inputs are empty strings ( or empty arrays)
const AccessKeyId = core.getInput('aws-access-key-id', { required: false });
const SecretAccessKey = core.getInput('aws-secret-access-key', { required: false });
const sessionTokenInput = core.getInput('aws-session-token', { required: false });
const SessionToken = sessionTokenInput === '' ? undefined : sessionTokenInput;
const region = core.getInput('aws-region', { required: true });
const awsProfile = core.getInput('aws-profile', { required: false });
const overwriteAwsProfile = getBooleanInput('overwrite-aws-profile', { required: false });
const roleToAssume = core.getInput('role-to-assume', { required: false });
const audience = core.getInput('audience', { required: false });
const maskAccountId = getBooleanInput('mask-aws-account-id', { required: false });
const roleExternalId = core.getInput('role-external-id', { required: false });
const webIdentityTokenFile = core.getInput('web-identity-token-file', { required: false });
const roleDuration =
Number.parseInt(core.getInput('role-duration-seconds', { required: false })) || DEFAULT_ROLE_DURATION;
const roleSessionName = core.getInput('role-session-name', { required: false }) || ROLE_SESSION_NAME;
const roleSkipSessionTagging = getBooleanInput('role-skip-session-tagging', { required: false });
const transitiveTagKeys = core.getMultilineInput('transitive-tag-keys', { required: false });
const proxyServer = core.getInput('http-proxy', { required: false }) || process.env.HTTP_PROXY;
const customTags = core.getInput('custom-tags', { required: false });
const inlineSessionPolicy = core.getInput('inline-session-policy', { required: false });
const managedSessionPolicies = core.getMultilineInput('managed-session-policies', { required: false }).map((p) => {
return { arn: p };
});
const roleChaining = getBooleanInput('role-chaining', { required: false });
const outputCredentials = getBooleanInput('output-credentials', { required: false });
// Default to always outputting environment credentials unless profile is specified. If profile is specified, default
// to no environment credentials (but still output them if the user specifically requests it).
const outputEnvCredentials = getBooleanInput('output-env-credentials', { required: false, default: !awsProfile });
const unsetCurrentCredentials = getBooleanInput('unset-current-credentials', { required: false });
let disableRetry = getBooleanInput('disable-retry', { required: false });
const specialCharacterWorkaround = getBooleanInput('special-characters-workaround', { required: false });
const useExistingCredentials = core.getInput('use-existing-credentials', { required: false });
let maxRetries = Number.parseInt(core.getInput('retry-max-attempts', { required: false })) || 12;
const expectedAccountIds = core
.getInput('allowed-account-ids', { required: false })
.split(',')
.map((s) => s.trim());
const forceSkipOidc = getBooleanInput('force-skip-oidc', { required: false });
const noProxy = core.getInput('no-proxy', { required: false });
const stsEndpoint = core.getInput('sts-endpoint', { required: false });
const globalTimeout = Number.parseInt(core.getInput('action-timeout-s', { required: false })) || 0;
let timeoutId: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
if (globalTimeout > 0) {
core.info(`Setting a global timeout of ${globalTimeout} seconds for the action`);
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
core.setFailed(`Action timed out after ${globalTimeout} seconds`);
process.exit(1);
}, globalTimeout * 1000);
}
if (forceSkipOidc && roleToAssume && !AccessKeyId && !webIdentityTokenFile) {
throw new Error(
"If 'force-skip-oidc' is true and 'role-to-assume' is set, 'aws-access-key-id' or 'web-identity-token-file' must be set",
);
}
if (specialCharacterWorkaround) {
// 😳
disableRetry = false;
maxRetries = 12;
} else if (maxRetries < 1) {
maxRetries = 1;
}
const withRetry = <T>(fn: () => Promise<T>, label: string): Promise<T> =>
retryAndBackoff(fn, !disableRetry, maxRetries, 0, 50, label);
// Logic to decide whether to attempt to use OIDC or not
const useGitHubOIDCProvider = () => {
if (forceSkipOidc) return false;
// The `ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN` environment variable is set when the `id-token` permission is granted.
// This is necessary to authenticate with OIDC, but not strictly set just for OIDC. If it is not set and all other
// checks pass, it is likely but not guaranteed that the user needs but lacks this permission in their workflow.
// So, we will log a warning when it is the only piece absent
if (
!!roleToAssume &&
!webIdentityTokenFile &&
!AccessKeyId &&
!process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN &&
!roleChaining
) {
core.info(
'It looks like you might be trying to authenticate with OIDC. Did you mean to set the `id-token` permission? ' +
'If you are not trying to authenticate with OIDC and the action is working successfully, you can ignore this message.',
);
}
return (
!!roleToAssume &&
!!process.env.ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN &&
!AccessKeyId &&
!webIdentityTokenFile &&
!roleChaining
);
};
if (unsetCurrentCredentials) {
unsetCredentials(outputEnvCredentials);
}
if (!region.match(REGION_REGEX)) {
throw new Error(`Region is not valid: ${region}`);
}
if (roleSessionName.length < 2 || roleSessionName.length > 64) {
throw new Error(
`Role session name must be between 2 and 64 characters, got ${roleSessionName.length}: '${roleSessionName}'`,
);
}
if (!roleSessionName.match(ROLE_SESSION_NAME_REGEX)) {
throw new Error(
`Role session name is not valid: '${roleSessionName}'. Must satisfy regular expression pattern: [\\w+=,.@-]*`,
);
}
exportRegion(region, outputEnvCredentials);
// Instantiate credentials client
const clientProps: {
region: string;
proxyServer?: string;
noProxy?: string;
stsEndpoint?: string;
roleChaining: boolean;
} = {
region,
roleChaining,
};
if (proxyServer) clientProps.proxyServer = proxyServer;
if (noProxy) clientProps.noProxy = noProxy;
if (stsEndpoint) clientProps.stsEndpoint = stsEndpoint;
const credentialsClient = new CredentialsClient(clientProps);
let sourceAccountId: string;
let webIdentityToken: string;
//if the user wants to attempt to use existing credentials, check if we have some already
if (useExistingCredentials) {
const validCredentials = await areCredentialsValid(credentialsClient);
if (validCredentials) {
core.notice('Pre-existing credentials are valid. No need to generate new ones.');
if (timeoutId) clearTimeout(timeoutId);
return;
}
core.notice('No valid credentials exist. Running as normal.');
}
// If OIDC is being used, generate token
// Else, export credentials provided as input
if (useGitHubOIDCProvider()) {
try {
webIdentityToken = await withRetry(async () => {
return core.getIDToken(audience);
}, 'getIDToken');
} catch (error) {
throw new Error(`getIDToken call failed: ${errorMessage(error)}`);
}
} else if (AccessKeyId) {
if (!SecretAccessKey) {
throw new Error("'aws-secret-access-key' must be provided if 'aws-access-key-id' is provided");
}
// The STS client for calling AssumeRole pulls creds from the environment.
// Plus, in the assume role case, if the AssumeRole call fails, we want
// the source credentials to already be masked as secrets
// in any error messages.
exportCredentials({ AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken }, outputCredentials, outputEnvCredentials);
// If using IAM User Credentials, write to profile now so that the assumeRole call can succeed (and also for
// credential validation before role assumption).
if (awsProfile) {
writeProfileFiles(awsProfile, { AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken }, region, overwriteAwsProfile);
}
} else if (!webIdentityTokenFile && !roleChaining) {
// Proceed only if credentials can be picked up. validateCredentials resolves the ambient
// credentials via the SDK default chain, proves they work, and returns the caller identity.
const identity = await withRetry(
() => credentialsClient.validateCredentials(undefined, undefined, roleChaining),
'validateCredentials',
);
// Enforce the allowed-account-ids guardrail unless a role will be assumed, in which case the
// final account is validated after assumeRole (these ambient credentials are the source account).
if (!roleToAssume) {
validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds, identity.Account);
}
sourceAccountId = exportAccountId(identity, maskAccountId);
}
if (AccessKeyId || roleChaining) {
// Validate that the credentials the action will use actually work, and resolve their identity.
const resolutionCredentials =
outputEnvCredentials || !AccessKeyId
? undefined
: toCredentialIdentity({ AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, SessionToken });
const identity = await withRetry(
() => credentialsClient.validateCredentials(resolutionCredentials, AccessKeyId, roleChaining),
'validateCredentials',
);
// Enforce the allowed-account-ids guardrail unless a role will be assumed (the final account is
// validated after assumeRole; these are the source credentials).
if (!roleToAssume) {
validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds, identity.Account);
}
sourceAccountId = identity.Account;
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
exportAccountId(identity, maskAccountId);
}
}
if (customTags && (useGitHubOIDCProvider() || webIdentityTokenFile)) {
core.warning(
"'custom-tags' is set but will be ignored because session tags cannot be applied when using OIDC or web identity token authentication. " +
'Tags are controlled by the identity provider token claims in these authentication flows.',
);
}
// Get role credentials if configured to do so
if (roleToAssume) {
let roleCredentials: AssumeRoleCommandOutput;
do {
roleCredentials = await withRetry(async () => {
return assumeRole({
credentialsClient,
sourceAccountId,
roleToAssume,
roleExternalId,
roleDuration,
roleSessionName,
roleSkipSessionTagging,
transitiveTagKeys,
webIdentityTokenFile,
webIdentityToken,
inlineSessionPolicy,
managedSessionPolicies,
customTags,
});
}, 'AssumeRole');
} while (specialCharacterWorkaround && !verifyKeys(roleCredentials.Credentials));
core.info(`Authenticated as assumedRoleId ${roleCredentials.AssumedRoleUser?.AssumedRoleId}`);
exportCredentials(roleCredentials.Credentials, outputCredentials, outputEnvCredentials);
// Validate the assumed-role credentials and resolve their identity.
const identity = await withRetry(
() => credentialsClient.validateCredentials(toCredentialIdentity(roleCredentials.Credentials)),
'validateCredentials',
);
// Enforce the allowed-account-ids guardrail against the assumed (final) account.
validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds, identity.Account);
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
exportAccountId(identity, maskAccountId);
}
// Write profile files if profile mode is enabled
if (awsProfile) {
if (!roleCredentials.Credentials) {
throw new Error('AssumeRole call succeeded but returned no credentials');
}
// If user provided IAM User Credentials and then we assumed a role, overwrite the profile file to add
// the session token. (this only overwrites the profile within a single run of the action).
if (AccessKeyId || !process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS) {
writeProfileFiles(awsProfile, roleCredentials.Credentials, region, true);
} else {
writeProfileFiles(awsProfile, roleCredentials.Credentials, region, overwriteAwsProfile);
}
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_PROFILE', awsProfile);
}
}
} else {
core.info('Proceeding with IAM user credentials');
if (awsProfile) {
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_PROFILE', awsProfile);
}
}
}
// Clear timeout on successful completion
if (timeoutId) clearTimeout(timeoutId);
} catch (error) {
core.setFailed(errorMessage(error));
const showStackTrace = process.env.SHOW_STACK_TRACE;
if (showStackTrace === 'true') {
throw error;
}
}
}
/* c8 ignore start */
/* istanbul ignore next */
if (require.main === module) {
(async () => {
await run();
})().catch((error) => {
core.setFailed(errorMessage(error));
});
}