Files
configure-aws-credentials/src/helpers.ts
T
Tom Keller 4d281fbc56 fix: enforce allowed-account-ids on all auth paths (#1847)
* fix: enforce allowed-account-ids on all auth paths

The allowed-account-ids list was only enforced in some auth flows. This
was due to the check being included in validateCredentials, which was
skipped if (GITHUB_ACTIONS && AccessKeyId && output-env-credentials) ->
false.

This unifies credential validation into a single path.

- validateCredentials(credentials?, ...) resolves credentials, proves
  liveness via one GetCallerIdentity call, and returns the identity.
- validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds, account) is now a pure comparison
  against the resolved account, enforced against the final (assumed)
  account independent of auth method, GITHUB_ACTIONS, or
  output-env-credentials.
- exportAccountId(identity, ...) consumes the resolved identity instead of
  making its own GetCallerIdentity call, so credential resolution happens
  exactly once per credential set.

Pre-assume account checks remain gated on !roleToAssume so cross-account
assume-role (source account differs from the role's target) is preserved.

Adds regression tests for the OIDC wrong-account case (the previously
missing negative test), OIDC with output-env-credentials: false, and the
assume-role wrong-account case.

* chore: move validateAccountId into helpers
2026-06-26 13:33:19 -07:00

428 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import * as path from 'node:path';
import * as core from '@actions/core';
import type { Credentials, STSClient } from '@aws-sdk/client-sts';
import { GetCallerIdentityCommand } from '@aws-sdk/client-sts';
import type { AwsCredentialIdentity } from '@aws-sdk/types';
import type { UserAgent } from '@smithy/types';
import type { CredentialsClient } from './CredentialsClient';
const MAX_TAG_VALUE_LENGTH = 256;
const SANITIZATION_CHARACTER = '_';
const SPECIAL_CHARS_REGEX = /[!@#$%^&*()_+\-=[\]{};':"\\|,.<>/?]+/;
const USER_AGENT_PREFIX = 'configure-aws-credentials-for-github-actions';
const UA_FIELDS: ReadonlyArray<{ env: string; label: string; pattern: RegExp }> = [
{ env: 'GITHUB_ACTION', label: 'action', pattern: /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,128}$/ },
{ env: 'GITHUB_RUN_ID', label: 'run_id', pattern: /^[0-9]{1,20}$/ },
{ env: 'GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT', label: 'attempt', pattern: /^[0-9]{1,10}$/ },
];
export function buildCustomUserAgent(): UserAgent {
const tokens: UserAgent = [[USER_AGENT_PREFIX]];
for (const { env, label, pattern } of UA_FIELDS) {
const value = process.env[env];
if (value === undefined) continue;
if (pattern.test(value)) {
tokens.push(['md', `${label}#${value}`]);
} else {
core.warning(`${env} has unexpected format; omitting from User-Agent`);
}
}
return tokens;
}
export function translateEnvVariables() {
const envVars = [
'AWS_REGION',
'ROLE_TO_ASSUME',
'WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE',
'ROLE_CHAINING',
'AUDIENCE',
'HTTP_PROXY',
'MASK_AWS_ACCOUNT_ID',
'ROLE_DURATION_SECONDS',
'ROLE_EXTERNAL_ID',
'ROLE_SESSION_NAME',
'ROLE_SKIP_SESSION_TAGGING',
'TRANSITIVE_TAG_KEYS',
'INLINE_SESSION_POLICY',
'MANAGED_SESSION_POLICIES',
'OUTPUT_CREDENTIALS',
'UNSET_CURRENT_CREDENTIALS',
'DISABLE_RETRY',
'RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS',
'SPECIAL_CHARACTERS_WORKAROUND',
'USE_EXISTING_CREDENTIALS',
'NO_PROXY',
'OVERWRITE_AWS_PROFILE',
];
// Treat HTTPS_PROXY as HTTP_PROXY. Precedence is HTTPS_PROXY > HTTP_PROXY
if (process.env.HTTPS_PROXY) process.env.HTTP_PROXY = process.env.HTTPS_PROXY;
for (const envVar of envVars) {
if (process.env[envVar]) {
const inputKey = `INPUT_${envVar.replace(/_/g, '-')}`;
process.env[inputKey] = process.env[inputKey] || process.env[envVar];
}
}
}
// Configure the AWS CLI and AWS SDKs using environment variables and set them as secrets.
// Setting the credentials as secrets masks them in Github Actions logs
export function exportCredentials(
creds?: Partial<Credentials>,
outputCredentials?: boolean,
outputEnvCredentials?: boolean,
) {
if (creds?.AccessKeyId) {
core.setSecret(creds.AccessKeyId);
}
if (creds?.SecretAccessKey) {
core.setSecret(creds.SecretAccessKey);
}
if (creds?.SessionToken) {
core.setSecret(creds.SessionToken);
}
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
if (creds?.AccessKeyId) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID', creds.AccessKeyId);
}
if (creds?.SecretAccessKey) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY', creds.SecretAccessKey);
}
if (creds?.SessionToken) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_SESSION_TOKEN', creds.SessionToken);
} else if (process.env.AWS_SESSION_TOKEN) {
// clear session token from previous credentials action
core.exportVariable('AWS_SESSION_TOKEN', '');
}
}
if (outputCredentials) {
if (creds?.AccessKeyId) {
core.setOutput('aws-access-key-id', creds.AccessKeyId);
}
if (creds?.SecretAccessKey) {
core.setOutput('aws-secret-access-key', creds.SecretAccessKey);
}
if (creds?.SessionToken) {
core.setOutput('aws-session-token', creds.SessionToken);
}
if (creds?.Expiration) {
core.setOutput('aws-expiration', creds.Expiration);
}
}
}
export function unsetCredentials(outputEnvCredentials?: boolean) {
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID', '');
core.exportVariable('AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY', '');
core.exportVariable('AWS_SESSION_TOKEN', '');
core.exportVariable('AWS_REGION', '');
core.exportVariable('AWS_DEFAULT_REGION', '');
}
}
export function exportRegion(region: string, outputEnvCredentials?: boolean) {
if (outputEnvCredentials) {
core.exportVariable('AWS_DEFAULT_REGION', region);
core.exportVariable('AWS_REGION', region);
}
}
export async function getCallerIdentity(client: STSClient): Promise<{ Account: string; Arn: string; UserId?: string }> {
const identity = await client.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
if (!identity.Account || !identity.Arn) {
throw new Error('Could not get Account ID or ARN from STS. Did you set credentials?');
}
const result: { Account: string; Arn: string; UserId?: string } = {
Account: identity.Account,
Arn: identity.Arn,
};
if (identity.UserId !== undefined) {
result.UserId = identity.UserId;
}
return result;
}
// Emits the account ID and ARN of an already-resolved caller identity as action outputs.
export function exportAccountId(identity: { Account: string; Arn: string }, maskAccountId?: boolean) {
const accountId = identity.Account;
const arn = identity.Arn;
if (maskAccountId) {
core.setSecret(accountId);
core.setSecret(arn);
}
core.setOutput('aws-account-id', accountId);
core.setOutput('authenticated-arn', arn);
return accountId;
}
// Validates that the account of the already-resolved caller identity is in the allow-list provided via the
// `allowed-account-ids` input.
export function validateAccountId(expectedAccountIds: string[] | undefined, account: string | undefined): void {
if (!expectedAccountIds || expectedAccountIds.length === 0 || expectedAccountIds[0] === '') {
return;
}
if (!account || !expectedAccountIds.includes(account)) {
throw new Error(
`The account ID of the provided credentials (${
account ?? 'unknown'
}) does not match any of the expected account IDs: ${expectedAccountIds.join(', ')}`,
);
}
}
// Converts the STS Credentials shape (returned by AssumeRole and provided as action inputs) into
// the AwsCredentialIdentity shape the SDK expects when credentials are supplied explicitly to a
// client. Returns undefined if the access key ID or secret access key is missing.
export function toCredentialIdentity(creds?: Partial<Credentials>): AwsCredentialIdentity | undefined {
if (!creds?.AccessKeyId || !creds.SecretAccessKey) {
return undefined;
}
return {
accessKeyId: creds.AccessKeyId,
secretAccessKey: creds.SecretAccessKey,
...(creds.SessionToken && { sessionToken: creds.SessionToken }),
};
}
// Tags have a more restrictive set of acceptable characters than GitHub environment variables can.
// This replaces anything not conforming to the tag restrictions by inverting the regular expression.
// See the AWS documentation for constraint specifics https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_Tag.html.
export function sanitizeGitHubVariables(name: string) {
const nameWithoutSpecialCharacters = name.replace(/[^\p{L}\p{Z}\p{N}_.:/=+\-@]/gu, SANITIZATION_CHARACTER);
const nameTruncated = nameWithoutSpecialCharacters.slice(0, MAX_TAG_VALUE_LENGTH);
return nameTruncated;
}
export async function defaultSleep(ms: number) {
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
}
let sleep = defaultSleep;
export function withsleep(s: typeof sleep) {
sleep = s;
}
export function reset() {
sleep = defaultSleep;
}
export function verifyKeys(creds: Partial<Credentials> | undefined) {
if (!creds) {
return false;
}
if (creds.AccessKeyId) {
if (SPECIAL_CHARS_REGEX.test(creds.AccessKeyId)) {
core.debug('AccessKeyId contains special characters.');
return false;
}
}
if (creds.SecretAccessKey) {
if (SPECIAL_CHARS_REGEX.test(creds.SecretAccessKey)) {
core.debug('SecretAccessKey contains special characters.');
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
// Retries the promise with exponential backoff if the error isRetryable up to maxRetries time.
export async function retryAndBackoff<T>(
fn: () => Promise<T>,
isRetryable: boolean,
maxRetries = 12,
retries = 0,
base = 50,
label?: string,
): Promise<T> {
try {
return await fn();
} catch (err) {
if (!isRetryable) {
core.debug(`retryAndBackoff: error is not retryable: ${errorMessage(err)}`);
throw err;
}
// It's retryable, so sleep and retry.
const delay = Math.random() * (2 ** retries * base);
const nextRetry = retries + 1;
const opName = label ? ` ${label}` : '';
core.info(
`Retry${opName}: attempt ${nextRetry} of ${maxRetries} failed: ${errorMessage(err)}. ` +
`Retrying after ${Math.floor(delay)}ms.`,
);
await sleep(delay);
if (nextRetry >= maxRetries) {
core.info(`Retry${opName}: reached max retries (${maxRetries}); giving up.`);
throw err;
}
return await retryAndBackoff(fn, isRetryable, maxRetries, nextRetry, base, label);
}
}
/* c8 ignore start */
export function errorMessage(error: unknown) {
return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
}
export function isDefined<T>(i: T | undefined | null): i is T {
return i !== undefined && i !== null;
}
/* c8 ignore stop */
export async function areCredentialsValid(credentialsClient: CredentialsClient) {
const client = credentialsClient.stsClient;
try {
const identity = await client.send(new GetCallerIdentityCommand({}));
if (identity.Account) {
return true;
}
return false;
} catch (_) {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Like core.getBooleanInput, but respects the required option.
*
* From https://github.com/actions/toolkit/blob/6876e2a664ec02908178087905b9155e9892a437/packages/core/src/core.ts
*
* Gets the input value of the boolean type in the YAML 1.2 "core schema" specification.
* Support boolean input list: `true | True | TRUE | false | False | FALSE` .
* The return value is also in boolean type.
* ref: https://yaml.org/spec/1.2/spec.html#id2804923
*
* @param name name of the input to get
* @param options optional. See core.InputOptions. Also supports optional 'default' if the input is not set
* @returns boolean
*/
export function getBooleanInput(name: string, options?: core.InputOptions & { default?: boolean }): boolean {
const trueValue = ['true', 'True', 'TRUE'];
const falseValue = ['false', 'False', 'FALSE'];
const optionsWithoutDefault = { ...options };
delete optionsWithoutDefault.default;
const val = core.getInput(name, optionsWithoutDefault);
if (trueValue.includes(val)) return true;
if (falseValue.includes(val)) return false;
if (val === '') return options?.default ?? false;
throw new TypeError(
`Input does not meet YAML 1.2 "Core Schema" specification: ${name}\n` +
`Support boolean input list: \`true | True | TRUE | false | False | FALSE\``,
);
}
// O_NOFOLLOW is undefined on Windows. This sets it to 0 if it's not defined.
const O_NOFOLLOW: number = (fs.constants as { O_NOFOLLOW?: number }).O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0;
export function isAllowListed(filePath: string): boolean {
// Kubelet projects service-account tokens through a symlink chain
// (token -> ..data/token, ..data -> ..<timestamp>/). The containing path is
// kubelet-controlled, so we allow symlink-following reads of this fixed
// location only.
const KUBERNETES_TOKEN_PATH_REGEX = /^\/var\/run\/secrets\/[^/]+\/serviceaccount\/token$/;
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
// No Kubernetes token paths on Windows
return KUBERNETES_TOKEN_PATH_REGEX.test(path.posix.normalize(filePath));
}
return false;
}
export function isSymlink(filePath: string): boolean {
try {
return fs.lstatSync(filePath).isSymbolicLink();
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') return false;
throw err;
}
}
// Refuses if filePath or its parent directory is a symbolic link.
function refuseSymlinkOnPath(filePath: string): void {
const parent = path.dirname(filePath);
if (parent !== filePath && isSymlink(parent)) {
throw new Error(`Refusing ${filePath} (parent directory is a symbolic link)`);
}
if (isSymlink(filePath)) {
throw new Error(`Refusing ${filePath} (path is a symbolic link)`);
}
}
function assertRegularFile(fd: number, filePath: string): void {
const stats = fs.fstatSync(fd);
if (!stats.isFile()) {
throw new Error(`${filePath} (path is not a regular file)`);
}
}
// ENOENT: file does not exist
// ELOOP: too many symbolic links (from NOFOLLOW)
export function readFileUtf8(filePath: string): string | null {
const allowSymlink = isAllowListed(filePath);
if (!allowSymlink) {
refuseSymlinkOnPath(filePath);
}
const openFlags = fs.constants.O_RDONLY | (allowSymlink ? 0 : O_NOFOLLOW);
let fd: number;
try {
fd = fs.openSync(filePath, openFlags);
} catch (err) {
const code = (err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code;
if (code === 'ENOENT') return null;
if (code === 'ELOOP') {
throw new Error(`Refusing ${filePath} (path is a symbolic link)`);
}
throw err;
}
try {
assertRegularFile(fd, filePath);
return fs.readFileSync(fd, 'utf-8');
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
}
export function writeFileUtf8(filePath: string, content: string, mode = 0o600): void {
refuseSymlinkOnPath(filePath);
let fd: number;
try {
fd = fs.openSync(filePath, fs.constants.O_WRONLY | fs.constants.O_CREAT | fs.constants.O_TRUNC | O_NOFOLLOW, mode);
} catch (err) {
if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ELOOP') {
throw new Error(`Refusing ${filePath} (path is a symbolic link)`);
}
throw err;
}
try {
assertRegularFile(fd, filePath);
// openSync only applies mode on creation.
// If the file already exists, we need to ensure the mode is correct.
if (process.platform !== 'win32') {
fs.fchmodSync(fd, mode);
}
fs.writeFileSync(fd, content);
} finally {
fs.closeSync(fd);
}
}
export function mkdir(dir: string, mode = 0o700): void {
fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode });
if (isSymlink(dir)) {
throw new Error(`Refusing ${dir} (path is a symbolic link)`);
}
}